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CRIMINAL SANCTIONS FOR DRUG ABUSE DURING
PREGNANCY: THE ANTITHESIS OF FETAL HEALTH
Two recent cases have brought to the public's attention a growing
trend in criminal law - the imposition of criminal sanctions against
pregnant women whose drug abuse during pregnancy has resulted in the
injury or death of their fetuses or newborns.' In 1988, Brenda Vaughn
pleaded guilty in Washington D.C. to forgery charges. As a first offender
she could have received probation, but because she was pregnant and drug
tests showed evidence of cocaine use, the judge sent her to jail until her
due date, saying he wanted to protect the fetus. 2 And on August 25,
1989, Jennifer Johnson was sentenced to one year in a rehabilitation
program and fourteen years probation following her conviction in Florida
stemming from her drug abuse during pregnancy.' Increasing public
awareness of the proliferation of drug abuse and its resultant problems has
drawn a wide base of support for public action on drug abuse.' Coupled
with the fact that the most innocent and vulnerable victims, the developing
fetuses, are at considerable risk as a result of their mothers' addictions,
many jurisdictions are addressing the problem of drug abuse during
pregnancy with criminal sanctions. 5 While this evidences an awareness
1. United States v. Vaughn, Crim. No. F2172-88B (Super. Ct., D.C., June 24,
1988); State v. Johnson, 89-890 CFA (Cir. Ct. Seminole Co. 1989).
2. Lewin, When Courts Take Charge of the Unborn, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1989, at
Al, col. 1 (the baby was born healthy); Sachs, Here Come the Pregnancy Police,
TIME, May 22, 1989, at 104.
3. Sherman, Keeping Babies Free of Drugs, Nat'l L. J., Oct. 16, 1989, at 1, col.
4. Ms. Johnson was charged with child abuse after her twins tested positive for cocaine
at birth. She was acquitted of the child abuse charges, because Florida law does not
consider a fetus to be a child. But she was convicted of delivering a controlled
substance to a minor, based upon the sixty to ninety seconds during the birth when the
babies were out of the birth canal and the umbilical cords were still attached. N.Y.
Daily News, Aug. 11, 1989, at A23, col. 2 (misnaming the defendant, but quoting the
assistant state's attorney who prosecuted the case). The Daily News article detailed
charges against a pregnant Connecticut woman who was charged with "risk of injury to
a minor" after she swallowed a quarter-ounce of cocaine as she was about to be arrested.
Id.
4. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
5. For examples of sanctions being imposed in various jurisdictions, see the sources
cited supra note 1 (Florida and Washington, D.C.); supra note 3 (Connecticut, South
Carolina, and Massachusetts), infra note 108 (Illinois); infra notes 100-108 (New York).
The aforementioned sources all deal with judicial responses to the problem; for a
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of the problem, it also indicates an insensitivity and lack of understanding
of the causes underlying maternal drug abuse.
This Note will show that criminal sanctions are the least effective
way to deal with maternal substance abuse, and will focus on the issue of
illicit drug abuse by pregnant women.6 Part I will discuss the existence
of a state interest in the fetus, as defined by the abortion cases. Part II
will discuss the problems inherent in using the abortion-defined state
interest in the context of fetal abuse statutes. Part III will consider the
effects of fetal abuse statutes on a woman's rights, and the problems
which arise in such a situation. Part IV will discuss the issue of a
woman's right to privacy, equal protection and due process
considerations, and the implications of state control of a pregnant
woman's behavior during her nine months of pregnancy. Finally, this
Note will conclude that the imposition of criminal sanctions is the wrong
approach to an unfortunate situation, that less intrusive approaches will be
more successful, and that all interests concerned will be better served by
intervention and treatment programs which are more cognizant of all the
factors giving rise to the problem. The appropriate response to maternal
drug abuse is to focus on education, intervention, and rehabilitation, not
retribution.

I. THE STATE'S INTEREST IN THE FETUS,
As DEFINED BY THE ABORTION CASES

The landmark case of Roe v. Wade, 7 defines and limits the
existence of a legitimate state interest in protecting the potential human

life. When the state seeks to control the conduct of a pregnant woman for
discussion of legislative responses, see infra notes 116-29 and accompanying text.
6. The use of licit drugs, such as alcohol or tobacco, present problems similar in

effect, but this Note will not deal with the abuse of these substances. Both substances
are legal, and highly regulated, insofar as there are laws limiting a person's right to use
either substance. Alcohol abuse during pregnancy can result in Fetal Alcohol Syndrome
(FAS), and the dangers of smoking during pregnancy has compelled the Surgeon General
of the United States to require warnings to be printed on cigarette packages warning of
the dangers of smoking during pregnancy. Notwithstanding these facts, the vast majority
of criminal cases brought against women for substance abuse during pregnancy involves
illicit drugs, a less socially-acceptable addiction, and a behavior more amenable to the
imposition of criminal sanctions, in the view of fetal abuse law advocates. Moreover,
the use of illegal drugs, especially those taken intravenously, puts the pregnant mother,
and thus her fetus, at risk of contracting the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) virus.
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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the purpose of protecting her fetus, the legitimacy of the state interest in
that fetus must be examined.' Of particular concern is the invasion by
the state into a very personal aspect of a woman's existence, whether such
invasion is legitimate and in the best interests of the mother, society, and
fetus.
The plaintiff in Roe challenged a Texas statute which criminalized
abortion, except where necessary to save the life of the mother.' In
deciding the case, the United States Supreme Court was faced with the
challenge of resolving the inherent conflict between two competing
interests, the privacy interests of the pregnant women seeking to terminate
their pregnancies and the interest of the individual states in prohibiting
consensual abortions. 1 In the Court's determination, the decision to
undergo an abortion was the exercise of a constitutionally protected right,
The Court, while declining to
grounded in the right to privacy."
"resolve the difficult question of when life begins," 2 found that a fetus
to the fourteenth amendment protections accorded a
is not entitled
"person." 3 Nevertheless, the Court determined that the state does have
a legitimate interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus. 4
In acknowledging the existence of a legitimate state interest, the
Court declared that the constitutional right to abortion,"' while a
fundamental right," was "inherently different"' ' from previously
declared fundamental rights such as marital intimacy, contraception, and
procreation." The right to have an abortion, the Court found, is in
direct conflict with another interest, that of the state to protect potential
life. It was from this acknowledgement that the viability issue, the point
where the state's interest arises, emanated.'" The Court held that a

8. Id. at 154.
9. Id. at 117-18 n.1.
10. Id. at 148-56.
11. Id. at 153.
12. Id. at 159.
13. Id. at 158.
14. Id. at 162.
15. The Court concluded that the right of privacy, which is founded in the
fourteenth amendment's concept of personal liberty, "is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 153.
16. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
17. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 163-64.
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state's interest does not become "compelling" (important enough so that
the state may act to protect its interests) until the point of viability.2'
Therefore, the state could-not act to prohibit pre-viability abortions for the
sole reason of preserving a fetus' potential life. 2
As the Court stated, the interest of the mother in procuring an
abortion and the interest of the state in protecting the potentiality of life
"are separate and distinct [and each interest] grows in substantiality as the
woman approaches term ....
": But in actuality, it appears that the
interest which grows as term approaches is solely the interest of the state,
at the expense and to the.detriment of the mother's privacy rights.' The
Court summarized:
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the
first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation
must be left to -the medical judgment of the pregnant
woman's attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of
the second trimester, the State, in promoting its interest
in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate
the abortion procedures' in ways that are reasonably
related to maternal health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State, in
promoting its interest in' the potentiality of human life
may, if it chooses, regulate and even proscribe, abortion
except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother.'
Thus, in the first time period the pregnant woman's privacy rights
are paramount and, the state's interest being non-existent, the state has no
right or power to interfere in the exercise of the choice of whether to
abort. In the second time period, a legitimate state interest exists, but
20. Id. at 164.
21. Id. at 164-65. The Supreme Court noted that regulations restricting or limiting
a "fundamental right" may be justified only by a "compelling state interest" and that any
laws restricting or limiting the fundamental right must be drafted so as to address only
the compelling state interest sought to ,be protected by the laws. Id. at 155.
22. Id. at 162-63.
23. See infra note 25.
24. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
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only that of protecting the health of the mother. Since this second time
period is pre-viability, s the state has no constitutionally valid
"compelling interest" in protecting the fetus' life. Therefore, the state can
only act in a manner which has the health of the mother as its "only
legitimate state interest."' It is only after the point of viability, defined
as twenty eight weeks, that the third period exists and the state has a
constitutionally compelling interest in protecting the potential life of the
fetus.'
Thus, during pregnancy, the woman begins with a period of
twelve weeks of complete autonomy, from conception to the end of the
first trimester. The second period, of approximately sixteen weeks
between the end of the first trimester to the point of viability, the

woman's personal autonomy is limited by the state's interest in protecting
her health. In the third period of post-viability, her personal autonomy
is at its lowest ebb, and the state's interest in either her health or the
health of the fetus supersedes her personal autonomy.2

The trimester rule, while subject to criticism,' has, until the
recent decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,' withstood
25. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
26. Id.
27. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-65.
28. One commentator argues that this progression vis-a-vis a pregnant woman's
autonomy makes sense. See Mathieu, Respecting Liberty and Preventing Harm: Limits
of State Intervention in PrenatalChoice, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 19 (1985). Ms.
Mathieu argues that a woman has two levels of obligation to a future child; the first
arises upon becoming pregnant. Id. at 36-37. At this stage,-it is argued, the woman owes
a duty of care like that owed a stranger, "to refrain from causing harm and, to some
extent, to trying to protect or remove the harm." Id. The second level arises when the
option of abortion has been forsaken, and for this period the woman places herself in a
"special relationship with her future child, a relationship that carries certain inherent
obligations similar to those of any parent toward his or her child." Id. at 37. Accord In
re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987), vacated, 539 A.2d 203 (D.C. 1988) "[A]s a matter
of law, the right of a woman to an abortion is different and distinct from her obligations
to the fetus once she has decided not to timely terminate her pregnancy." A.C., 533
A.2d at 614 (citing Mathieu, supra, at 24 n.16).
29. See generally Justice O'Connor's dissent inCity of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 454 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The State's
interest in maternal health changes as medical technology changes;") and Justice Scalia's
concurrence in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring) ("[ilt thus appears that the mansion of constitutionalized abortion law,
constructed overnight in Roe v. Wade, must be disassembled door-jamb by door-jamb,
...no matter how wrong itmay be.").
30. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
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legal challenges and provided grounds for striking down a variety of
abortion laws. The Supreme Court has applied the bright line test
provided by the Roe Court's viability standard to strike down laws such
as those giving fathers the right to veto abortions, 31 exposing doctors to
criminal sanctions for erroneous determinations as to viability,32
requiring any post-first trimester abortion to be performed in a
hospital,33 and requiring physicians to utilize techniques in third trimester
abortions which provide the best opportunity for the fetus to be aborted
alive . ' In Webster, the Supreme Court took a major step in extending
the state interest prior to the point of viability as defined by Roe. The
Missouri law at issue, enacted in 1986, provided that tests were required
to determine if the fetus was viable:
[The law] creates what is essentially a presumption of
viability at twenty weeks, which the physician must rebut
with tests indicating that the fetus is not viable prior to
performing an abortion. It also directs the physician's
determination as to viability by specifying consideration,
if feasible, of gestational age, fetal weight, and lung
capacity."
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White and Kennedy,
found that the test required by the second part of the statute "permissibly
furthers the State's interest in protecting potential human life . . . .
Because this statute allows testing and procedures whose goal is to protect
potential human life prior to the twenty eighth week, its designation of the
twentieth week as the point at which the state's interest becomes
compelling called into question its constitutionality. Based upon this fact,
it had been attacked as a clear violation of the standard established by
Roe v. Wade.37 The plurality's decision to uphold the statute on this
point was predicated on their "throw[ing] out Roe's trimester
31. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
32. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
33. City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 416.
34. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747 (1986).
35. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 515. (1989).
36. Id. at 519-20.
37. Id. at 515.

1991]

NOTES

framework."3 The plurality, while acknowledging stare decisis as a
cornerstone of the American judicial system, noted the Court's history of
reconsidering earlier decisions which had proven "unsound in principle
and unworkable in practice, '"" and declared that "the Roe trimester
framework falls into this category. '
The plurality cited Justice White's opinion in Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists4" wherein Justice
White claimed the trimester framework of Roe had rendered the Court the
"ex officio medical board with powers to approve or disapprove medical
and operative practices and standards throughout the United States." '42
The plurality also noted the district court's finding that while twenty three
and one-half to twenty four weeks of gestation is the earliest point where
a reasonable possibility of viability exists it was also found that there may
be a four week margin of error in estimating gestational age "which

supports testing at twenty weeks." 43
As another justification for abandoning the trimester rule of Roe,
38. Id. at 541 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
39.
Id. at 518.
40. id.
41. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
42. Webster, 492 U.S. at 519.
43. Id. at 516. While the state may have an interest in a fetus as early as the 20th
week, there are limits to what medical testing can disclose at that point of development.
See Kolata, Doctor's Tools Limited in Testing Fetal Vulnerability, N.Y. Times, July 4,
1989, § 1, at 10, col. 5 (the limiting factor in determining whether a premature baby
will live is the maturity of the lungs; but before the twenty third or twenty fourth weeks,
a fetus' lungs are too underdeveloped to support life. Dr. Robert Sefalo, professor of
obstetrics and gynecology and director of the Maternal-Fetal Medicine Division of the
University of North Carolina School of Medicine, is quoted as saying that at twenty
weeks of gestation "the lung test is not useful," and that doctors usually do not look at
lung development until thirty two weeks of gestation). Further clouding this issue of
viability in the drug abuse during pregnancy context is the consideration that the drug
abuse itself appears to retard intrauterine development, so the result may be a fetus
whose gestational age may suggest viability, under either Webster or Roe limits, but
whose developmental age is much lower than its gestational age. See generally
Chouteau, Effects of Cocaine Abuse on Birth Weight and GestationalAge, 72 OBSTET.
& GYNECOL. 351 (1988) (cocaine abuse during pregnancy appears to be a significant
predictor of low birth weight and early gestational age); Mitchell, Ultrasonic Growth
Parameters in Fetuses of Mothers with Primary Addiction to Cocaine, 159 AM. J.
OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 1104 (1988) ("[Alddicted fetuses more frequently exhibit
intrauterine growth retardation patterns.").
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the plurality in Webster cited two dissenting opinions in Thornburgh"
and stated "we do not see why the state's interest in protecting human life
should come into existence only at the point of viability, and that there
should therefore be a rigid line allowing state regulation after viability but
prohibiting it before viability., 4 5
While the Webster decision did not explicitly overrule Roe v.
Wade," it has opened the door to further restrictions on abortion by state
legislatures inclined to limit Roe. In explicitly rejecting the trimester
framework, the Supreme Court implicitly stated its belief that the state
interest could be declared compelling at any point of development, and
echoed the increasingly prevalent theory that life begins at the instant of
conception.47 And if one accepts the proposition that life begins at
conception, the issues of fetal rights, fetal abuse statutes, and intervention
into the life and activities of a pregnant woman will surely become more
compelling. Accepting the premise that the state has an interest in
protecting the developing fetus in the context of maternal substance abuse,
the issue of viability from the abortion cases may be interpreted as
providing a justification for intervening in the behavior of the pregnant
woman in order to protect her fetus. But, as will be explained below,"
such an interpretation is not valid, and not effective in promoting fetal
health.

II.

THE PROBLEMS INHERENT IN. APPLYING STATE INTERESTS
IN THE FETUS AS DEFINED BY THE ABORTION CASES
IN THE FETAL ABUSE CONTEXT

While Roe v. Wade49 defines the timetable under which the
44. Justice White, dissenting, wrote "[tihe State's interest, if compelling after
viability, is equally compelling before viability." Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 795 (White,
J., dissenting) (footnote omitted); Justice O'Connor, also dissenting, wrote "[t]he State
has compelling interests in ensuring maternal health and in protecting potential human
life, and these interests exist 'throughout pregnancy."' Id. at 828 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (citing City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S.
416, 461 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
45. Webster, 492 U.S. at 519.
46. "This case therefore affords us no occasion to revisit the holding of Roe..
and we leave it undisturbed." Id. at 521.
47. Id. at 514-22; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161-62, 164-65 (1973)
(articulated trimester system).
48. See infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
49. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
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state's interest increases in the life of the unborn, it has been argued that
the trimester framework has no application outside of the limited context
of non-therapeutic abortions. 5 As one commentator has noted: "[iln the
fetal abuse context, the state's interests are not preservation of the
mother's health and the protection of potential life against [abortion], but
the enhancement of the born child's quality of life through protection of

the fetus from reckless or negligent harm."

1

The problem with applying the abortion concepts of viability and
compelling state interests to drug abuse during pregnancy is that the
interests involved in abortion and fetal protection are very different. 2
Roe and its progeny establish only the point up to which the woman's
privacy rights are offset by a countervailing state interest sufficient to

50. Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs. The Case against the Criminalization

of Fetal Abuse, 101 HARV. L. REV. 994, 997 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Maternal
Rights]; Note, Maternal Substance Abuse: The Need to Provide Legal Protection for the
Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1209, 1220 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Maternal Substance
Abuse].
51. See Note, Maternal Rights, supra note 50, at 997.
52. See Field, Controlling the Woman to Protect the Fetus, 17 LAW MED. &
HEALTH CARE 114, 123-24 (Summer 1989) ("[t]he different ... interest[s] explain why
the trimester system that applies to abortion has no application to controls on the motherto-be."); Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: What's Wrong With Fetal
Rights, 10 HARV. WoMEN's L.J. 9, 15 (1987) (In the medical treatment context,
"[iJnvocation of Roe as an authority for disregarding a woman's objection to surgery
demands a serious distortion of that landmark case."); Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal
Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal
Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 612 (1986) ("[tlhe 'state purpose' is not to preserve the
life of the fetus against the pregnant woman's will, but to prescribe a woman's behavior
during her wanted pregnancy.") (emphasis in original); Mathieu, supra note 27, at 32
("A pregnant woman's obligation to act for the sake of her future child is independent
of her right to get an abortion. "); Rush, Prenatal Caretaking: Limits of State Intervention
With and Without Roe, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 55, 64 (1987) ("With the tenor of the Roe
opinion, concerned simply with determining if and when the fetus could be destroyed,
it is difficult to ascribe to the Roe opinion a state interest in the fetus' quality of life.");
Note, Maternal Rights, supra note 50, at 997 (The state's interest is not the "protection
of potential life against [abortion], but the enhancement of the born child's quality of life
....");Note, Maternal Substance Abuse, supra note 50, at 1220 (stating that "[Rjoe
may be inapposite."). But see Parness, Crimes Against the Unborn: Protecting and
Respecting the Potentiality of Human Life, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 97, 115 (1985) (The
Roe court's "use of the term 'potential life' can be read to connote only the state's
interest in assuring that the unborn of: today will be born and live a healthy life
tomorrow.").
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deny her the right to obtain a non-therapeutic abortion,53 and that at no
earlier point than viability can the state act in a manner which benefits the
fetus.' The crux of the abortion cases, therefore, is the state's interest
in the fetus which will not be born, if not for state intervention. The
stated goal of advocates of fetal abuse sanctions, on the other hand, does
not concern itself at all with the right to abortion; rather the goal is
healthy birth.55 Clearly, the latter interest is stronger, in most instances,
for all parties involved. "
The abortion issue is one which is politically charged, and
involves deep moral, ethical, and religious beliefs.57 The issue of
children being born healthy, and in a position to lead productive and
fulfilling lives encompasses these same beliefs, and also gives rise to
substantial economic considerations.5" Senator Pete Wilson of California
has stated in Congress that 375,000 babies are born to substance abusing
mothers annually,59 and that the cost of providing care to those babies
exceeds $13 billion per year.'
Obviously, the short-term costs are
astronomical, but when long-term costs of treatment and support of these
damaged children is considered, the cost soars even further.6
53. Roe had established the twenty eighth week as the point the state could act to
protect the fetus, and Webster upheld a Missouri statute moving the point back to the
20th week. See supra notes 21 and 33 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 21-24, 33, 36, 40-42, and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 50 and 52 and infra note 117 and accompanying text.
56. See Parness, supra note 52, at 98 (the goal is to ensure that "the unborn will
have the chance to live a whole or unimpaired life after birth.")
57. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 141-63 (1973) (for a discussion of the
positions of various amici on the abortion issue); Justice Scalia's concurrence in Webster,
"[w]e can now look forward to at least another Term with carts full of mail from the
public, and streets full of demonstrators, urging us . . . to follow the popular will."
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 533-37 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
58. See Note, Maternal Rights, supra note 50, at 1121-22.
59. 135 CONO. REc. 59320 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1989) (statements of Sen. Wilson).
60. Id. Representative George Miller, (D., California), estimates that from 1988
to 1991 one million drug-exposed babies will have been born, requiring $20,000 to
$100,000 each in intensive medical care just in infancy. Diesenhouse, Drug Treatment
is Scarcer Than Ever for Women, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1990, at E26, col. 6.
61. For example, drug abuse during pregnancy has been associated with an increase
in the number of children placed in foster care. It is estimated that for the period from
June 1987 to June 1990, there will have been a 28.6% increase in the number of
children in foster care. Landa, Crack's Sad Harvest.: Kids in Foster Care, N.Y. Daily
News, Feb. 5, 1990, at All, col. 1. According to the American Public Welfare
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In the context of narcotics use during pregnancy, the evidence is
compelling that in utero exposure has wide ranging and long lasting
effects on the fetus and child - with some results being low birth weight,
poor neurological and physical development, and socialization
problems.62 Based upon the evidence of the effects of drug abuse on
fetal development, the problem implicit in applying Roe's trimester or
viability standards becomes evident, and reliance on abortion defined
standards proves insupportable. Even under Webster's interpretation of
Association's nationwide survey of child welfare agencies, New York and California
account for 30% and 25%, respectively, of that projected increase. Id. According to
Douglas Besharov, resident scholar with the American Enterprise Institute in
Washington, D.C., who undertook this study with the American Public Welfare
Association, "[s]ince these kids are going to grow up to be future New Yorkers, it does
not bode well for our community life. . . . We're looking at a further drag on mental
health and social service resources in the city at a time when we can least afford it."
1d; see also Blakeslee, Crack's Toll on Infants Found to be Emotional Devastation,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1989, at Al, col. 2 and A26, col. 3 (reporting studies by Dr. Ira
Chasnoff, Director of the Perinatal Center for Chemical Dependence at Northwestern
University School of Medicine in Chicago and Dr. Judith Howard, Director of the
Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect Team at the University of California at Los Angeles,
which indicate that as these infants reach school age, intervention will be necessary,
since "[g]ood school and home environments are crucial for these children ....
They
will need lots of structure and individual attention."). For comprehensive discussions
of the effect of parental substance abuse on children's development, see Howard, The
Development of Young Children ofSubstance-Abusing Parents:Insightsfrom Seven Years
of Intervention and Research, ZERO TO THREE, June 1989, at 8 and NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION FOR PERINATAL ADDICTION RESEARCH AND EDUCATION [NAPAREJ,
NEWS, (press release dated Sept. 17, 1989) (detailing Dr. Ira Chasnoff's speech to
NAPARE's National Training Forum on Drugs, Alcohol, Pregnancy, and Prevention,
delivered Sept. 19, 1989 in Miami, Florida).
62. See generally Bingol, Teratogenicity of Cocaine in Humans, 110 J. PEDIATRICS
93 (1987) (reduced birthweight, increased stillbirth rate related to abruptio placentae, and
a higher malformation rate); Goldin, Cocaine Abuse in Pregnancy, 262 J. A.M.A. 771
(Aug. 11, 1989) (low birth weight and poor neurological development); Howard,
Cocaine and its Effects on the Newborn, 31 DEV. MED. CHILD NEUROL. 255 (1989)
(infants' behavior is deviant, poor attention span, and rapid shifts between irritability and
lethargy); Schnoll, Substance Abuse, 261 J. A.M.A. 2890 (May 19, 1989) (low birth
weight, genitourinary malformations, and intrauterine strokes, if cocaine ingested shortly
before term); Telsey, Cocaine Exposure in a Term Neonate: Necrotizing Enterocolitis
as a Complication, 27 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 547 (1988) (spontaneous abortions, preterm
labor, cerebral infarctions, and neurobehavioral and neurophysiologic abnormalities);
Wachtsman, What Happens to Babies Exposed to Phencyclidine (PCP) In Utero?, 15
AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE 31 (1989) (babies exposed to PCP were shown to have
temperament and sleep problems, as well as small stature).
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the state's interest (albeit only in preserving potential life of the fetus) as
compelling at a point as early as twenty weeks of gestation,' 3 significant

harm will have been done within those twenty weeks, so the imposition
of criminal sanctions would serve little preventative function and appear
to be solely vindictive.'
Also, if a woman is faced with criminal
sanctions, she will likely be less inclined to seek prenatal care, which will

further endanger her fetus' chances for healthy development in the womb
and a productive life.'
As long as abortion remains an option for women, the imposition
of sanctions, or threat of sanctions for fetal abuse during pregnancy raises
serious concerns. Arguably, a pregnant woman could abuse drugs during
the early part of her pregnancy and then, if the threat of sanctions is
realized, or implemented, the woman could avail herself of the abortion
option, and theoretically remove herself from the criminal justice system.
The perverse result of this would be the abortion of fetuses which have
sustained substantial damage due to maternal addiction, as well as the
abortion of fetuses with minimal damage due to infrequent drug abuse by
the pregnant mother.' This horrific situation, although hypothetical, is
63. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 518-19 (1989).
64. In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the Court struck down a
statute which made the mere status of being an addict a crime, finding that the statute
violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments as cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at
667. In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas wrote, "[wle would forget the teachings
of the Eighth Amendment if we allowed sickness to be made a crime and permitted sick
people to be punished for being sick. This age of enlightenment cannot tolerate such
barbarous action." Id. at 678 (Douglas, J., concurring). While drug abuse during
pregnancy is admittedly not a "status" as contemplated by Robinson, the underlying
causes are the same; thus Justice Douglas' observations should still be considered. See
generally Chavkin, Help, Don't Jail, Addicted Mothers, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1989, §
1, at 21, col. 2. For a discussion of the effects of alcohol consumption during
pregnancy on the fetus, see Rosenthal, When a Pregnant Woman Drinks, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 4, 1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 30 (the fetus experiences physical malformations from
heavy drinking in the first trimester and growth retardation from drinking in the third
trimester, brain damage can occur at any time).
65. See infra notes 244, 247, 249-50, and accompanying text.
66. Illinois State Senator Richard Kelly, an abortion opponent, while believing a
child should have a right to take some sort of civil action against its mother for injuries
due to illegal drug use during pregnancy, will not introduce a bill to that effect out of
fear that such a law would lead to more abortions. Marcotte, Critne and Pregnancy,
A.B.A. J. 14 (Aug. 1989). Senator Kelly's concern over the effect of a civil cause of
action gives rise to another issue which has been pointed to as a justification for criminal
sanctions for drug abuse during pregnancy. Several commentators note that prenatal
harm is now recognized as a legitimate tort cause of action against either the mother or
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a real possibility. The pregnant mother would face a choice between her
own liberty and the life of her fetus. Any state intervention which could
conceivably lead a woman to choose an abortion has, as the above
hypothetical situation indicates, put the pregnant mother and her fetus in
an "adversarial position"6' which can hardly be characterized as
beneficial to the development, birth, and rearing of healthy children."
One aspect of the Court's decision in Webster' which
substantially broadened Roe's possible application outside the context of
abortions was the Webster Court's refusal to invalidate the preamble of
the Missouri abortion law at issue.' ° The Missouri court of appeals had
invalidated the preamble, 71 relying on Roe and its progeny, which had
established that "a state may not adopt one theory of when life begins to
justify its regulation of abortions."' The United States Supreme Court
in Webster decided that the court of appeals "misconceived" the meaning
of dicta in City of Akron v. Akron Centerfor Reproductive Health,' and
a third party, see, e.g., Mathieu, supra note 28, at 24-28; Parness, supra note 52, at
161-62; Rush, supra note 52, at 61-4, Note, Maternal Substance Abuse, supra note 50,
at 1236-37. These commentators, in effect, argue that criminal sanctions are a logical
adjunct to this civil liability. Nevertheless, it is the author's contention that the existence
of a civil remedy cannot justify the imposition of criminal sanctions for several reasons.
First, while the threat of civil liability to a mother may be enough to dissuade her from
engaging in behavior which is potentially harmful to her fetus, more importantly it is not
likely to compel her to avoid prenatal care in an attempt to avoid detection and the
imposition of criminal sanctions. See infra notes 237-48 and accompanying text.
Second, the threat of civil liability is probably not a viable deterrent to many women
because, as one commentator noted, "[iut seems unlikely that such suits would be brought
in the first place absent availability of liability insurance." Note, The Fetal Rights
Controversy:A Resurfacing of Sex Discrimination in the Guise of Fetal Protection, 57
UMKC L. REV. 261, 264 n.16 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Fetal Rights Controversy]. If
women are not obtaining medical care, one major reason is likely to be the lack of
medical insurance, and if one cannot afford medical insurance, it is unlikely one can
afford, or would obtain, liability insurance.
67. See Field, supra note 52, at 124-25; Johnsen, supra note 52, at 613; Note,
Maternal Rights, supra note 50, at 1009.
68. See sources and material cited supra note 66.
69. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
70. id. at 506-07.
71. Reproductive Health Services v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071, 1076-77 (8th Cir.
1988), rev'd sub nom., Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
72. id. at 1075, (quoting City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 444 (1983)).
73. 462 U.S. 416, 444 (1983).
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mistakenly interpreted the meaning of the preamble as expressing a "value
judgment" favoring childbirth over abortion. 4 Because the Supreme
Court reasoned the meaning of the preamble had not been "applied to
restrict the activities of the appellees in some concrete way,""' the Court
saw no need to pass judgment on the constitutionality of the preamble.7'
This implicit acceptance of the Missouri preamble has already found
adherents. First, in a divorce proceeding, a state appellate judge in
Tennessee found that seven frozen embryos, fertilized in anticipation of
in vitro fertilization prior to the divorce proceedings, were "children," as
opposed to property, and awarded "custody" to the mother.' Secondly,
in Pasco, Florida, a county court judge refused a woman's request for a
postponement of her sixty day jail sentence so she could first obtain an
abortion.7"
The judge was quoted as saying "[d]o you want a
continuance so you can murder your baby, is that it?"79 While the
Florida judge's reasons for the denial are not clear, this quote implies the
denial was more the result of a personal opinion on the subject of
abortion, and possibly on the question of when life begins.
This second example also raises the specter of another major
effect of Webster, whereby the plurality redefined the nature of the
privacy interest in abortion. The Court declared the right to obtain an
abortion to be a "liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause," '
as opposed to a "fundamental right" or "limited constitutional right" as
established by Akron and Roe."1 In redefining the abortion right as a
"liberty interest" the Court applied a more lenient "permissibly furthers"
74. Webster, 492 U.S. at 506-07.

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. The woman wanted the embryos to continue her attempts to become pregnant;
the man opposed that use, and preferred the embryos be destroyed. Davis v. Davis, No.
E-14496 (Tenn. App. 1989) (LEXIS, States library, Tenn. file). The judge specifically
referred to the Webster decision, stating that the application of Roe and Webster is
limited to abortion cases, and claimed that life begins at conception and found the seven
frozen embryos to be human beings. Id. at 30-32.
78. Court Rejects Pleafor Abortion Before Jail, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1989, at A3,
col. 6 (Judge Dan C. Rasmussen of Pasco County Court).
79. Id. The defendant had asked for the continuance because she was afraid she
may get out of jail too late for a safe abortion. Id. After the defendant pleaded financial
inability to care for a baby, the judge suggested she carry it to term and put it up for
adoption. Id.
80. Webster, 492 U.S. at 520.
81. Id.
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standard rather than the stricter standard imposed by Roe and its progeny,
which required a statute to be "narrowly drawn to address only the
legitimate state interest. '"I The Webster standard requires only that a
statute be "reasonably designed" to address the legitimate state interest. 83
By redesignating the privacy interest to a liberty interest, the Court was
able to apply a less strict standard by which to evaluate the "fit" between
the statute at issue and the state interest it addresses, and in effect uphold
a statute where the "fit" is not as snug as the more strict standard of
scrutiny would require.
What the reasoning in Webster illustrates, in a large sense, is the
Court's narrow perception of a woman's privacy rights, particularly in the
reproductive sphere, and a significant retrenchment in the direction of
limiting a woman's privacy rights in reproduction. Justice Blackmun
characterized it as an "implicit invitation to every state to enact more and
more restrictive abortion laws, and to assert their interest in potential life
as of the moment of conception." " The decision, although rendered in
the abortion context, provides ample grounds for considering and
speculating on the Supreme Court's possible interpretation of fetal abuse
statutes, because the Webster treatment, of both the issues of viability and
when life begins, addresses due process and equal protection issues which
give rise to special considerations when the issue of criminal sanctions for
drug abuse during pregnancy is raised.
III. THE EFFECTS OF FETAL RIGHTS
ON THE RIGHTS OF PREGNANT WOMEN
The Supreme Court has never explicitly accorded the protections
and rights provided a "person" under the fourteenth amendment to a
fetus. 8" Clearly, were a fetus considered a person in the abortion
82. Id. at 519. The Court declared the Missouri law to be "reasonably designed"
to address a legitimate state interest in controlling abortions. Id. at 521. This test is
similar to the "rational relation" test that Chief Justice Rehnquist advocated in his
dissenting opinion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 171, 173 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
83. Webster, 492 U.S. at 520-21.

84. Webster, 492 U.S. at 556 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
85. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158. After noting various laws allowing a live born child an
action sounding in tort for prenatal injuries, allowing the parents of a stillborn child to
maintain a wrongful death action arising from prenatal injuries, and an unborn child's
legal right to inherit property, the Roe Court went on to say that "the unborn have never
been recognized as persons in the whole sense." Id. at 161-62.

430

JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

[Vol. VIII

context, a veritable Pandora's Box would be opened, because the liberty
interests of the two entities, ideally in harmony, could in reality be in
opposition. The Roe Court, probably cognizant of this fact even in
defining the point where a state's interest becomes compelling, declined
6
to declare a viable fetus a person.1
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services did not explicitly address
the issue of "personhood" for the fetus, 87 but rather changed the time
frame within which the state could interpose its interests and prohibit the
mother from obtaining an abortion. 8 Advocates for fetal rights, aware
of the damage drug abuse inflicts on the fetus, suggest that when quality
of life, as opposed to abortion, is at issue, a fetus should be granted full
legal protection, and not merely post-viability. 9 Proponents rely on the
ability of the state to intervene after birth with child abuse and neglect
proceedings to argue for the extension of the doctrine of parens patriae'
into the womb. Also, support for fetal rights is claimed to exist in the
line of cases which allow parties to force caesarean surgery on pregnant
women against their will, 91 and other forced medical treatment, such as
86. Id. at 158.
87. The preamble to the Missouri law in question explicitly addressed the
personhood issue: it "sets forth 'findings' by the Missouri legislature that '[tihe life of
each human being begins at conception,' and that '[ulnborn children have protectable
interests in life, health, and well-being."' Webster, 492 U.S. at 504 (citing Mo. REV.

STAT. §§ 1.205.1(1),(2) (1986)).
88. Id. at 518-19.
89. See generally Mathieu, supra note 28, at 37 (a future child has important
interests which must be weighed against the mother's interests); Myers, Abuse and
Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State Intervene?, 23 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 66 (1984) (state
intervention should be authorized throughout the vulnerable period, including previability); Parness, supra note 52, at 114 ("[Tlhe states retain the option of according
dignity to the unborn at every stage of development."); Note, MaternalSubstance Abuse,
supra note 50, at 1226-27 (advocating intervention throughout pregnancy either by using
existing child abuse statutes or drafting new laws specifically tailored for that purpose).
90. Parenspatriae "[riefers traditionally to [the] role of [the] state as guardian of
persons under legal disability .... It is a concept of standing utilized to protect these

quasi-sovereign interests such as health, comfort and welfare of the people." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979). The fact that this definition uses the words
"person" and "people" has not stopped several courts from extending the doctrine into
the womb, notwithstanding the fact that a fetus has never been declared to be a "person."
See supra notes 77, 86-88.
91. Inre A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C.1987), vacated, 539 A.2d 203 (D.C.1988)
(terminally ill woman forced to undergo emergency caesarean section; both she and the
child died); see also Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital, 247 Ga. 86, 274
S.E.2d 457 (1981) (temporary custody of in utero fetus granted to State Department of
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blood transfusions.' Such invasive procedures, in addition to increasing
the risk of harm to the pregnant woman, raise constitutional issues of

privacy, bodily integrity and freedom of religion, to mention a few.'
Similarly, the imposition of criminal sanctions for fetal abuse
raises several constitutional issues, such as privacy, bodily integrity, and
cruel and unusual punishment.9
There are two means by which
sanctions are or could be imposed, and both have constitutional
implications. The first means, and the one most often applied due to the
lack of development and enactment of specifically tailored statutes, is the
application of present child abuse statutes. The second means is the
enactment of specifically tailored laws dealing specifically with drug abuse

during pregnancy.
An early application of a standard child abuse statute was in 1977
in Reyes v. Superior Court of San Bernadino County. 95 In Reyes, the
court issued a preemptory writ of prohibition against prosecuting the
defendant who, against advice of a nurse, had continued to use heroin and
avoid prenatal care through her pregnancy.'
She subsequently gave
birth to addicted twins.' The court reasoned that the statute as written
applied only to living children "susceptible to care and custody," and that
the legislature had intended to exclude the unborn from the statute by
Human Resources, along with authority to approve caesarean section if necessary); see
also Field, supra note 52 at 117-18, (discussing In reA.C., as well as other cases where
caesarean sections were performed on women who objected due to fear, preference for
natural childbirth, or religious reasons).
92. See generally Raleigh-Fitkin Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson, 42
N.J. 421,201 A.2d 537 (1964) (the court appointed a guardian for the fetus, with power
to consent to blood transfusions, because the mother, a Jehovah's Witness, had refused
such treatment on religious grounds). For a comprehensive discussion of medical
intervention to treat a fetus during pregnancy, see Gallagher, supra note 52.
93. Field, supra note 52 at 118 n.38 (citing Bowes and Selgestad, Fetal Versus
MaternalRights: Medical and Legal Perspectives, 59 OBSTET. AND GYNECOL. 209-211,
(July 1981)). Aside from a paternalistic motive, it is difficult to reconcile those cases
allowing forced medical treatment upon a woman with those which forbid the state from
pumping a criminal suspect's stomach or removing a bullet from a suspect's body for
evidence. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (one's bodily integrity
right outweighs state interest in pumping stomach of suspect for evidence); Winston v.
Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (one's bodily integrity precludes operation to remove bullet
from suspect's body).
94. See supra notes 87-88, and accompanying text.
95. 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 141 Cal' Rptr. 912 (1977).
96. Id. at 216, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 912-13.
97. Id., 141 Cal. Rptr. at 913.
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virtue of the legislature's treatment of the unborn in other statutes." A
similar situation in California occurred in 1985.1 Pamela Rae Stewart
had been warned that she had a problem pregnancy, and was told by her
doctor to stop taking drugs and to stop having intercourse." ° She
continued to take drugs and engage in intercourse, and her son was born
with severe brain damage and died six weeks later. 10 She was not
charged with child abuse, as was the defendant in Reyes, but rather with
violating a statute which prohibited a parent from wilfully omitting,
among other things, medical attention or other remedial care for a
child."° And while this statute specifically included unborn children in
its definition of a child, t0 the court dismissed the charges on the
grounds that "it was not intended to apply to a mother's refusal to obey

doctor's orders.''104
The results of these two California cases exemplify the problems
such prosecutions present, even in jurisdictions where legislatures have
seemingly responded to judicial actions. Other decisions indicate a wide
diversity of opinion on the propriety of applying child abuse statutes to
prenatal abuse. In 1985, a New York Family Court in Matter of
Smith"°5 found an unborn child to be a person within the meaning of
New York's Family Court Act, °6 and that the child, by virtue of the
prenatal abuse, was a neglected child.' 7 In this case, as in Pamela Rae
Stewart's, there was a pattern of substance abuse (alcohol) and a failure
to heed suggestions to stop drinking during pregnancy. 0 8 Furthermore,
this woman had a previous child placed in foster care and had been
ordered to enter a residential alcohol abuse treatment program.' °9 She
98. Id. at 218, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 914. The charges were dismissed Feb. 26, 1987.
L.A. Times, Feb. 27, 1987, § 1, at 3, col. 3.
99. California v. Stewart, No. M508197 (Municipal Ct. San Diego Co., Feb. 26,
1987).
100. Field, supra note 52, at 118.
101. For a discussion of this case, see supra note 52, at 118. See also Note,
Maternal Substance Abuse, supra note 50, at 1209.
102. Cal. Penal Code § 270 (West 1988).
103. Id. See also Field, supra note 52, at 127 n.40.
104. Id. at 118.
105. 128 Misc. 2d 976, 980, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331, 334-35 (Fam.Ct. 1985).
106. N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act § 1012 (McKinney 1988).
107. Smith, 128 Misc. 2d at 980, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 334.
108. Id. at 976-77, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
109. Id. at 976, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
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failed to comply with the court order and admitted consuming
approximately
ten drinks per day on an average of three or four days per
0
week.1
The result in Smith was rejected in 1988 in Matter of
Fletcher,"' another New York Family Court proceeding. Here the
newborn tested positive for cocaine and proceedings were commenced to
find the child a neglected child." 2 The court granted the mother's
motion to dismiss, finding the petitioner (Social Services) had failed to
state a cause of action." 3 While not deciding the case on the merits, the
judge commented on the practice of applying child abuse statutes to
women who are still pregnant." 4 After noting that a pregnant woman
is protected by constitutional rights of privacy and bodily integrity, the
judge wrote, in rejecting the applicability of the Family Court Act to
prenatal conduct:
I see no authority for the State to regulate women's
bodies just because they are pregnant. By becoming
pregnant, women do not waive the constitutional
protections afforded to other citizens. To carry . . . the
argument to its logical extension, the State wouldibe able
to supersede a mother's custody right to her child if she
smoked cigarettes during her pregnancy, or ate junk food
.. The list of potential intrusions is long and constitute
[sic] entirely unacceptable violations of the bodily
integrity of women ...."'
As these California and New York cases demonstrate, a successful
prosecution under existing child abuse statutes is not a certainty, although
the two New York cases indicate that past conduct and behavior may well
be a significant factor in determining how courts will look upon the
110. Id. at 977, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
111. 141 Misc. 2d 333, 533 N.Y.S.2d 241 (Fam. Ct. 1988).
112. id.
113. Id. at 338, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 243-44.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 337, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 243. Similar concern for the mother's privacy
rights was a reason cited for the grand jury's refusal to indict Melanie Green, a
Rockford, Illinois woman charged with involuntary manslaughter in the death of her two
day old daughter. Doctors had said Green's use of cocaine prior to giving birth caused
the baby's brain damage. Id. Wilkerson, Jury in Illinois Refuses to Charge Mother in
Drug Death of Newborn, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1989, § 1, at 10, col. 5.
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situation.
Not satisfied with the success of applying existing statutes,
advocates of fetal rights are resorting to the second option, that of drafting
new statutes dealing specifically with sanctions for pregnant women who

damage their fetuses.

With the widespread proliferation of drugs in

society, and the increasing public awareness of the costs of drug abuse,
public sentiment seems to be strongly against drug use and abuse. 1 6
Public officials, courts, and legislators are responding to this public
sentiment, most often with criminal sanctions, the least expensive, but
also least effective, means possible. 17
Commentators who advocate the enactment of new statutes' 18
generally interpret the Roe Court's use of the term "potential life"" 9 as
establishing a state interest "in assuring that the unborn of today will be
born and live a healthy life tomorrow."" 2 These commentators, finding
present statutes inadequate to provide prevention, deterrence, and
punishment, argue that new, specifically drafted statutes are needed to
ensure fetal health.'
Compulsory reporting by health care providers
116. A Gallup, poll conducted in 1988 for Hippocratesmagazine asked whether a
woman who smoked or drank alcohol during pregnancy should be held liable for harm
done to her fetus. Forty-eight percent of those who responded answered in the
affirmative. Choices of the Heart, HIPPOCRATES, May/June 1988, at 40. Considering
the fact that quite often the addicted are of lower socioeconomic status and members of
minorities, the substances are illegal, and the dynamics of addiction are not widely
understood, obviously a similar poll on illicit drugs would result in a substantially higher
percentage of responses supporting sanctions. In fact, one survey is reported which
found that 71% of the 1500 persons polled in fifteen southern states favored criminal
penalties for pregnant women who use illegal drugs during pregnancy. See Curriden,
Holding Mom Accountable, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1990, at 50. Furthermore, this survey
found that approximately the same percentage (45%) of persons responded to the same
question regarding alcohol and tobacco as was found in the Hippocratespoll, supra, and
that "more women than men were in favor of criminalizing 'fetal abuse."' Curriden,
supra, at 51.
117. See infra notes 116-131 and accompanying text.
118. See generally Parness, supra note 52; Mathieu, supra note 28; Myers, supra
note 89; Note, MaternalRights, supra note 50; Note, MaternalSubstance Abuse, supra
note 50.
119. 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
120. Parness, supra note 52, at 115 (footnote omitted).
121. See generally Parness, supra note 52; Mathieu, supra note 28; Myers, supra
note 89; Note, Maternal Rights, supra note 50; Note, MaternalSubstance Abuse, supra
note 50.
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is also promoted as a method to deal with this issue. " Despite these

sentiments, and evidence of public support for sanctions,"2 legislation
addressing fetal abuse has not met with much success."U
In the summer of 1989 then Senator Pete Wilson of California"z
introduced a bill entitled the Child Abuse During Pregnancy Prevention
Act of 1989 [hereinafter "the Act"].
The purpose of the Act was to

provide five $10 million grants to states to treat drug addicted
mothers. 27 The first two goals set forth in the purpose of the Act"
were to apply to those drug abusing women who were "strong enough to
seek [rehabilitation] voluntarily," and the third, mandatory rehabilitation,
"for others who cannot find the strength to [seek rehabilitation on their
own]."'" Further, toassist grantee states, the Act planned to "enlist
our Nation's health care professionals [through mandatory reporting of
suspected drug using mothers]. ""3
The anticipated utilization of health care providers for identifying
drug abusing mothers illustrates one significant flaw in this Act. While
acknowledging the importance of prevention, the relianceupon providers
of health care ignored the facts that drug abusing mothers are not likely
to seek prenatal health care,' and that those women interested in
seeking prenatal care may avoid their doctors to avoid detection. 32 By
122. See generally Parness, supra note 52; Mathieu, supra note 28; Myers, supra
note 89; and Note, MaternalRights, supra note 50.
123. See supra note 115.
124. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
125. Pete Wilson is currently the Governor.of California.
126. S. 1444, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 105, S9134 (daily ed. July
31, 1989).
127. The purpose of the Act was to:
(1)
prevent substance abuse by pregnant women;
(2)
prevent, by outreach and intervention during early
pregnancy, the continued substance abuse of pregnant women [and
the resultant injury to fetuses]; and
(3)
prevent, through the mandatory rehabilitation of women
[who have delivered addicted. babies] the recurrence [of those
mothers giving birth to addicted babies in the future] ...
S. 1444, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 107, S9320-21 (daily ed. Aug. 2,
1989) [hereinafter The Act].
128. Id.
129. 135 CONG. REC. S9320 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1989) (statement of Sen. Wilson).
130. Id.
131. See infra notes 266-74 and accompanying text.
132. Id.
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placing primary reliance on preventative measures which will be
implemented after detection by health care providers, the doctor-patient
relationship is turned into an adversarial relationship which will likely
compel many women carrying at-risk fetuses to avoid the medical care the
Act realizes is so important. The Act appears to promise education,
intervention, and rehabilitation only after detection as a drug abusing
mother. Emphasis should instead be placed on education and intervention
prior to pregnancy, when the risk to the woman's liberty is less, and the
chances for a problem free pregnancy and a healthy baby greater.' 33
As a requirement of eligibility for a grant under the Act, a state
was required to detail plans for "preventive outreach and education and
treatment.""' But of primary importance was the fact that the grantee
state must certify:
(4)
it is a crime in such state to abuse a child, and
that such abuse includes giving birth to an infant who is
addicted or otherwise injured or impaired by the
substance abuse of its mother during pregnancy; [and]
(5)
[that], on a conviction for a violation of the
criminal statute described in paragraph (4), the woman so
convicted shall be sentenced to a period of 3 years of
mandatory rehabilitation in a custodial setting ....
Coupling the requirement of specific criminal statutes with
mandatory reporting by health professionals, the Act was destined to
failure. For the reasons discussed in this Note, 1' any approach similar
to one suggested by this Act is doomed to failure, for the simple reason
that this approach will drive women at risk away from the necessary
37
prenatal health care.'
133. See infra notes 244, 246, and 253.
134. The Act, supra note 126, at § 3(c)(l)(A).
135. Id. at § 3(c)(4)-(5).
136. See infra notes 249-55 and accompanying text.
137. The Act was sent to the Committee on Labor and Human Relations, 135
CONG. REC. S9134 (daily ed. July 31, 1989), and there has been no action taken on it,
according to Ms. Tyler, staff member of Sen. D'Amato, Senator from New York (a cosponsor of the Act) (telephone conversation with author, March 6, 1990). While the Act
met with little success, several important amendments were attached to the Department
of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1990, H.R. 3015, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), which passed both chambers and was presented to President
Bush on November 20, 1989. 135 CONG. REC. H9154 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1989).
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On the state level, eight states presently have statutes pertaining
to drug abuse during pregnancy, yet the majority of these statutes address
merely remedial state action after birth.13 Only Minnesota included its
Amendment no. 727 provided for additional funds for drug programs, 135 CONG. REC.
S11973 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1989); amendment no. 867 provided grants for substance
abuse treatment for pregnant and postpartum women and their infants and amendment
no. 869 provided for additional funding to training additional professionals to assist in
rehabilitating drug addicts, id at S11975. According to an exchange between Senators
Kennedy and Harkin, it was stated that $40 million, at a minimum, will be earmarked
for the Model Projects for Pregnant and Postpartum Women Project, to be administered
by the Office for Substance Abuse Prevention. Id. at S11979 (testimony of Sen.
Harkin). These amendments, with minor changes, were part of the appropriations act
presented to President Bush on November 20, 1989. Most significantly, these
amendments all placed minimal importance on criminal sanctions; in fact, these
amendments were lauded because of their acknowledgment that criminal sanctions were
the wrong approach to the problem, see comments of Sen. Kohl, "[I] appreciate the good
faith efforts . . . to strike a compromise on the amendment dealing with pregnant,
substance abusing women. . . . Clearly reflected [in commentators' statements in a
Committee hearing] is a concern that promising pregnant women help on the one hand while threatening them with jail sentences with the other - may not be the best way to
encourage people to seek treatment .... " Id. at S11979 (and that the methods these
amendments emphasized, such as intervention, education, and treatment, were the best
way to deal with the problem); see also Note, Maternal Rights, supra note 50, at 1011
("[aittaching criminal liability to maternal conduct ... undermines [the doctor/patient]
relationship because it . . . would require doctors to become agents of the criminal
justice apparatus, monitoring maternal/fetal relations and reporting disobedient patients").
138. See, 1989 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 89-345, § 415.5082 (West) (providing an
expeditious court procedure by which a relative or other responsible person is appointed
a "guardian advocate" for a child likely to require medical care but whose drugdependent parents are unable to obtain it); 1989 Ill. Legis. Serv. 86-275 (West) (defines
newborn with controlled substance in its system neglected.); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-43.1 (Burns 1987) (a child born with fetal alcohol syndrome or addiction to a controlled
substance is deemed a child in need of services); Prenatal Exposure to Certain Controlled
Substances, 1989 Minn. Sess. Law ch. 290, Art. 5 (West) ("chemically dependent
person" includes pregnant woman who has engaged in habitual or excessive use of
certain controlled substances during pregnancy) Id. at §1(2)(b)(iii); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 432B.330 (Michie 1989) (child is in need of protection if suffering from
congenital drug addiction or fetal alcohol syndrome) Id. at 432B.330(l)(b); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1101 (West 1989) ("deprived child" includes one born addicted to
a controlled substance). In 1989, the Rhode Island legislature established a special
commission to study the current status of treatment programs available to drug abusing
mothers. See ACLU Women's Rights Project, State Legislation Pertaining to Drug
Abuse During Pregnancy, (Memorandum, Nov. 1989) [hereinafter ACLU
Memorandum]; UTAH CODE ANN. §62A-4-504 (1989) (mandatory reporting by medical
personnel of any child suffering at birth from fetal alcohol syndrome or fetal drug

438

JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

[Vol. VIII

legislation in a criminal bill, and mandates reporting by a physician who
"knows or has reason to believe that a woman is pregnant and has used
' 139
a controlled substance for a nonmedical purpose during pregnancy.
Since the majority of these statutes were enacted prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Webster,"4 one explanation for the decided emphasis
on after-born children is the more restrictive state interest as defined by
Roe and its progeny. A review of legislation introduced after the decision
in Webster should provide an accurate indication of the individual states'
responses to the less restrictive state interest Webster provides, but aside
from The Child Abuse During Pregnancy Prevention Act of 1989, there
are no legislative responses to evaluate.""
The American Civil Liberties Union Women's Rights Project has
compiled a list of legislation 42 which contains, in addition to the statutes
mentioned above, a summary of recently defeated legislation and pending
legislation. Noteworthy statutes that have been defeated include two
Illinois statutes, the first providing that persons delivering controlled
substances to pregnant women would be subject to twice the maximum
prison term, 4 and the second requiring reporting by doctors and
treatment personnel to the appropriate state agency and mandatory
participation in treatment programs for pregnant addicts. '"w The
former did not pass in the House, the latter died in House committee. 1"
The other defeated statutes dealt With drug tests for newborns andtreatment program funding."
Pending legislation does not evidence.
any response to Webster, because the legislation compiled by the ACLU
pertains only to notices warning of the danger of alcohol to pregnant
women, adding to the definition of child abuse children born with
controlled substances in their systems,' 47 and allowing the state to take
custody of children born with addiction or with illegal drugs in their
dependency).
139. Prenatal Exposure to Certain Controlled Substances, Art. 5, §5(1) (1989)
(codified 1989 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 290).
140. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
141. See supra note 137 for a discussion of several amendments drafted by
Congress bearing on the issue of drug abuse during pregnancy.
142. ACLU Memorandum, supra note 138.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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systems. 1
While the vast majority of the state statutes do not, at this point,
impose criminal sanctions on drug addicted women who are pregnant,
some may be inclined to do so in the future. But if state legislators
evaluate the Congressional response to the Child Abuse During Pregnancy
Act of 1989, and the amendments to, the appropriations act presented to
the President on November 20,_ 1989,"" they will likely realize that
criminal sanctions, and the. resultant . adversarial situation that arises
therefrom, are not the means by which. to ensure that healthy children will
be born.
IV. THE PREGNANT WOMAN'S PRIVACY RIGHTS AND THE EFFECTS OF
THE IMPOSITION OF FETAL RIGHTS

A pregnant woman's constitutionally mandated right to privacy is
a strong bar against the imposition of criminal sanctions for her behavior
and actions during pregnancy." 5 The rights of reproductive choice,
marriage, procreation, contraception, abortion, and family relationships
are all privacy rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 5' The
Fourteenth Amendment provides, in part, that no state can "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property,: without due process of law; nor deny
' 52
to any person within -its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws."'
The mother's right to conduct her, life as she feels proper or desirable
cannot legitimately be deemed, forfeited for the duration of her
pregnancy. 15
The issue of criminal sanctions for behavior during
pregnancy gives rise to certain questions: to. what extent does or can a
physical condition affect one's. entitlement to privacy-rights, is the right
to privacy and autonomy so expansive as.to protect any behavior, and
finally, because only women can become pregnant, does the issue of
148. Id.
149. See supra notes 117-27 and accompanying text.
150. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-55 (1973).
151. Johnsen, supra note 52, at 617 n.75. Ms. Johnsen cited Justice Brandeis'
dissent in Olmstead v. United.States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) ("[T]he framers of the
constitution] conferred, as against the Government,.the right to be left alone - the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man."). Johnsen, supra

note 52, at 615 n.2.
152. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
153. But see sources cited at supra note 28.
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sanctions raise equal protection or due process grounds?'A. Gender-Based Discrimination
It has been stated by several commentators that any governmental
control over a woman based upon her reproductive capabilities and her
exercise of those capabilities is discrimination based on sex, due to the
fact that only women can become pregnant. 55 The issue of sex
discrimination has long been an issue of debate, which has escalated
substantially since the 1960's."
As the Supreme Court grappled with the issue of sex
discrimination, it often had trouble deciding which level of scrutiny to
apply to the challenged statute to determine constitutionality. '57 Early
154. For a discussion of the fact that only women are the targets of fetal abuse
statutes, see infra note 211.
155. See Field, supra note 52, at 122, 124; Note, MaternalRights, supra note 50.
156. See Field, supra note 52; Note, Fetal Rights Controversy, supra note 66;
Erickson, Women and the Supreme Court: Anatomy is Density, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV.
209 (1974). Although women's rights were, arguably, not a consideration when the
fourteenth amendment was enacted, women's interests eventually found some degree of
protection under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. G. Gunther,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 409 (11th ed. 1987); accord Erickson, supra (noting the
Supreme Court's decision in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873),
which held that the purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to protect only the newly
freed slaves). Early challenges, however, resulted in paternalistic displays of gender
discrimination and stereotyping, as evidenced by Justice Bradley's concurring opinion
in Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873), where the Supreme Court upheld
an Illinois statute which denied women the right to practice law:
[tihe natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of life..
• . [The] paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the
noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the
Creator.
Id. at 141. That paternalism extended into the early twentieth century, when the Court
again expressed the pervasive view of a woman's place in society. In Mueller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). the Court sustained a state law which provided that
women could work no longer than ten hours per day in a laundry or factory. Id. at 416.
The Court noted, "[It is obvious] that [a] woman's physical structure ... place[s] her
at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence" and that "as healthy mothers are
essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of
public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race." Id. at
421.
157. See infra notes 159-70 and accompanying text.
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equal protection challenges involving women were met with low level
scrutiny by the Supreme Court. In Goesart v. Cleary,' the Court
rejected an attack on a Michigan statute which restricted a woman's right
to obtain a bartender's license, acknowledging legitimate state interests
which could justify the statute, and declared the law a valid exercise of
drawing a line "not without a basis in reason.""'5 This level of scrutiny
illustrates the lowest standard of review, and gives great deference to the
legislature.
The deferential approach in equal protection claims was altered
somewhat in Reed v. Reed,"w when the Court found that an Idaho
statute establishing a preference for men over women as administrators of
estates as a matter of convenience was a violation of equal protection.
The Court held that there was no rational relationship between the state
goal of administrative convenience and the preference utilized to effect
that state goal. 6 ' This level of scrutiny requires at the minimum a
"rational relationship" between the statute and the problem sought to be
remedied, so theoretically the proponent must demonstrate an ability of
the statute to address the goal sought to be achieved. 62 The Reed
decision has been interpreted to mean that administrative convenience is
an insufficient state interest to justify a sex-based classification.
Two years after Reed, the plurality opinion in Frontiero v.
Richardson " advocated the use of strict scrutiny of statutes
Justice Brennan, writing for the
differentiating on the basis of sex."
Court, noted "the imposition of special disabilities upon the members of
a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate 'the basic
concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to
158. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
159. Id. at 467. The state enacted the statute to prohibit women from working as
a bartender unless the bar was owned by the woman's father or husband, out of concern
that any other situation could result in "moral and social problems." Id. at 466. Justice
Frankfurter, writing for the Court, noted "the vast changes in the social and legal
position of women, "but rejected the contention that the law was "an unchivalrous desire
of male bartenders . . . to monopolize the calling." Id. at 465-67.
160. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
161. id. at 76-77. "mo give a mandatory preference to members of either sex [in
choosing administrators of estates to avoid intrafamily controversy] may not lawfully be
mandated solely on the basis of sex." Id.
162. Id. at 468.
163. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
164. Id. at 682.
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individual responsibility.' '' 1
Nevertheless, the strict scrutiny advocated by Justice Brennan,

failed to garner majority support" and the Court failed to establish a
consensus as to which level of scrutiny to apply to gender-based
classifications. " In Kahn v. Shevin,'" a state property tax exemption
for widows was upheld, under the "rationality test" of Reed, because the
law was "reasonably designed to further the state policy of cushioning the
financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for which that loss imposed
a disproportionately heavy burden."" The Court finally articulated the
appropriate level of scrutiny for sex-based classifications in Craig v.
Boren." The test, which has come to be known as the "elevated or
intermediate level [of] scrutiny," '71 struck down a law which was
justified by the state as an attempt to decrease the incidence of drunken
driving by prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of
twenty-one and females under the age of eighteen. "7 The Court found
the evidence that young men were more likely to be injured by and
arrested for drunken driving to provide too tenuous a justification for the
statute, which differentiated between females and males.
In Michael M. v. Superior Court, 74 a case which is instructive
because it involved a facially discriminatory statute upheld by the Court
165. id. at 686. Justice Brennan explicitly acknowledged the "[n]ation['s] ...long
and unfortunate history of sex discrimination" and agreed with appellants (women
challenging a military rule regarding dependency benefits whereby spouses of male
service members had automatic entitlement to benefits, while spouses of female service
members had to prove dependency) that "classifications based on sex, like classifications
based on race, alienage, and national origin, are inherently suspect and must therefore
be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny." Id. at 688.
166. Id. at 719.
167. Id. at 725.
168. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
169. Id. at 355.
170. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
171. Id. at 218 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 204 (plurality opinion).
173. Id. at 199-204. Justice Powell, concurring, wrote that the decision depended
on "whether the legislature ... has adopted a means that bears a 'fair and substantial
relation' to this objective." Id. at 211. Justice Stevens, in concurrence, found the
statute to be "a mere remnant of the now almost universally rejected tradition of
discriminating against males in this age bracket .....
Id. at 212 (Stevens. J.
concurring).
174. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
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due in part to a consideration of pregnancy, a California statute which
subjected a male of any age to criminal sanctions for engaging in sexual
relations with a female under the age of eighteen, but imposed no
sanctions on a female for having sexual relations with a male under the
age of eighteen, was challenged as violative of the equal protection
clause.17 The justification accepted by the Court for the statute was6
17
that the state wanted to prevent illegitimate teenage pregnancies.
Justice Rehnquist (now Chief Justice Rehnquist) again refused to designate
gender-based discrimination "inherently suspect," and refused to apply
strict scrutiny to the statute. He noted that "this Court has consistently
upheld statutes where the gender classification is not invidious, but rather
realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in
certain circumstances." 77 He went on to state, "Because virtually all
of the significant . . . consequences of teenage pregnancy fall on the
young female, a legislature acts well within its authority when it elects to
punish only the participant who, by nature, suffers few of the
consequences of his conduct.""7 '
The standard announced in Craig was affirmed in Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan.'79 Justice O'Connor, writing the
majority, slightly changed the standard of Craig, but adhered to its main
principles." 8 The test, as Justice O'Connor applied it, had two levels.
First, the objective of the statute must be "legitimate and important."1'
Second, "a direct, substantial relationship between objective and means"
must be present." Justice O'Connor went on to note that "considering
both the asserted interest and the relationship between the interest and the
methods used by the State . . . the State has fallen far short of
establishing the 'exceedingly persuasive justification' needed to sustain the
175. Id.
176. Id. at 470.
177. Id. at 468.
178. Id. at 473. Arguably, fetal rights advocates may seize upon this phrase as
evidence of the correctness of their goals - the Court explicitly acknowledging the
differences between the sexes, vis-a-vis reproductive capabilities, and allowing the
imposition of criminal sanctions on the party which suffers few of the consequences of
her conduct. But the equal protection and due process clauses are not mutually
exclusive, and the author's contention is that if an equal protection claim fails, due
process protections will provide a substantial barrier to fetal abuse sanctions.
179. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
180. Id. at 719.
181. Id. at 724.
182. Id.
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gender-based classification. '
If the two-pronged test articulated by
Justice O'Connor in Hogan is applied to fetal abuse statutes, it is fairly
obvious that the first prong of the test, a legitimate and important state
interest, is satisfied. The interest of the state is to deter harm to the
potential life. However, the second prong, a direct and substantial
relationship between the objective and the means, is not met. Imposing
sanctions on a pregnant woman for addictive behavior she cannot control
serves little deterrent value, and the effect of sanctions is not likely to
result in healthy newborns.'" But as the result in Michael M. indicates,
statutes affecting behavior which is unpopular or morally unacceptable
might be given greater deference by the Court under a level of scrutiny
that is arguably outcome determinative.' 85
B. Pregnancy Discrimination in the Employment Context
A consideration of pregnancy discrimination in the employment
context is enlightening. Women, like men, have to work. The right to
employment which is free of discrimination based upon sex, or
pregnancy, or other factors unrelated to job performance is a right which
can be considered fundamental.' 86
The cases dealing with pregnancy discrimination in the
employment field (like reproductive rights) have focused on both due
process and equal protection grounds. As one commentator has put it, the
due process analysis concentrates on the woman's right to make certain
reproductive choices without undue state interference, while the equal
protection analysis concentrates on whether the state has treated the sexes
183. Id. at 731.
184. See infra notes 240-50 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 150-70 and accompanying text for examples of how the level
of scrutiny applied to a particular statute often appears to be related to the competing
interests implicated, and how the Court's perception and valuation of those interests will
likely dictate the judicial outcome; see also Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D.
Tex. 1982), rev'd other grounds, 769 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1985) (refusing to consider
homosexuality to be a suspect classification meriting strict scrutiny; rationality review
upheld).
186. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LeFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-48 (1974) (state's use
of arbitrary cut-off date to terminate pregnant public school teacher violated due process
clause of fourteenth amendment); cf Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, 111 S.
Ct. 1196, 1200-02 (1991) (private employment discrimination on basis of child bearing
capacity unlawful under title VI! of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
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equally.'"
5
In Cleveland Board of Education v. LeFleur,"'
various school

board rules which established mandatory unpaid pregnancy leave for
public school teachers were challenged as violative of the due process

clause. The school board had attempted to justify the cut off dates as
necessary to maintain continuity of classroom instruction. 5 9
Acknowledging this goal as "a significant and legitimate educational
goal,"" g the Court nonetheless concluded that the arbitrary cut off dates
had no rational relationship to the school board's asserted goals.''
Moreover, the Court ruled that the cut off dates violated due process
because they created a conclusive presumption that every teacher who was
four or five months pregnant was physically unfit to teach, regardless of
individual situations, and that the administrative convenience defense "is
insufficient to make valid what otherwise is a violation of due process of
law."" o
In Geduldig v. Aiello," at issue was a California disability
insurance program for private employees who were temporarily disabled
from work by injury or illness not covered by workers'
compensation. "
The program excluded from coverage certain
disabilities attributable to pregnancy.' 95 Acknowledging that California
had a legitimate interest in maintaining the insurance program as
instituted, the majority decided the legislature's choice not to insure all
187. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special
Treatment Debate, 13 REV. L. SOC. CHANGE 325, 343 (1984-85).
188. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
189. Id.at 640.
190. Id.at 641.
191. id.at 643.
192. Id.at 647.
193. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
194. Id.at 486-89.
195. Id. at 489. Four women challenged the provisions, and of those four, three
had disabilities attributable to abnormal complications during their pregnancies. Id.
Prior to the district court's ruling on the case, California's Court of Appeals ruled, in
a different suit, that the provision did not bar benefits when the medical complications
arise during pregnancy. id. at 490. Appellants acquiesced in the state court decision,
and the three women who had complications during their pregnancies became entitled
to benefits, so the Supreme Court interpreted the issue before it to be exclusively
whether the provision invidiously discriminated against the one appellee, and others
similarly situated, by not paying benefits for disability arising out of normal pregnancy
and childbirth. Id.at 491-92.
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risks was a legitimate exercise of discretion." The Court further found
that the decision not to insure pregnancy was not discrimination based on
sex; rather pregnancy was viewed as a "risk" which the state was not
required to provide coverage for. The Court noted "[tlhere is no risk
from which men are protected and women are not. Likewise, there is no
risk from which women are protected and men are not."' 97
The view of pregnancy as a "risk" in Geduldig was relied upon
two years later when employees challenged a similar provision under title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,"' which proscribes employment
discrimination based on sex. At issue in General Electric Company v.
Gilbert'99 was again a disability plan which covered non job-related
After quoting from Geduldig at length, the Court stated
accidents."
"[s]ince it is a finding of sex-based discrimination that must trigger, in a
case such as this, the finding of an unlawful employment practice under
[Title VII] . . . Geduldig is precisely on point in its holding that an
exclusion of pregnancy from a disability-benefits plan providing general
coverage is not gender discrimination at all.""'
Gilbert was overruled by Congress in 1982 when the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act" (hereinafter PDA) amended title VlI's definition
of sex discrimination to include discrimination based upon pregnancy.'
But insofar as Gilbert was brought under title VII, while Geduldig was
brought under the equal protection clause, Geduldig remains the precedent

196. Citing Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). Justice
Stewart noted a state "[m]ay take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the
problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind ....The legislature may select
one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others ...." Geduldig,
417 U.S. at 495 (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955)).
197. Id. at 496-97. "Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are
mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against members of one sex
or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to [deny coverage for pregnancy]...
just as with respect to any other physical condition." Id. at 496-97 n.20.
198. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-(e)(17) (1987).
199. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 136.
202. 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k) (1987). The Act provides: "the terms 'because of sex'
or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of
pregnancy, childbirth, . . .and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment related purposes." Id.
203. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684
(1983) ("[t]he Pregnancy Discrimination Act has now made clear that... discrimination
based on a woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her sex").
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in equal protection, with the PDA providing, at most, persuasive
authority.'
Notwithstanding the protections afforded pregnant women by the
PDA,' restrictions on pregnant womens' employment do exist, and
have survived judicial scrutiny. Employment policies restricting the
employment options of pregnant women are classified as fetal
Typically, employers will limit
vulnerability programs or policies."
pregnant or fertile women's access to those positions where the employees
are required, or likely, to come in contact with a variety of chemicals
which are proven or suspected to have a detrimental effect on a

developing fetus?

Among the chemicals common in the workplace

and known to affect workers' health are lead, benzene, vinyl chloride,

fluorocarbons, mercury and radiation.

8

The problem of chemical exposure in the workplace, and an
employer's response to the hazard, was at issue in Wright v. Olin
After four years of planning, Olin Corporation, in
Corporation.'
1978, adopted its "female employment and fetal vulnerability"
program, 210 which created three job classifications for all female
employees, and limited their access to certain jobs. 2" Male employees
204. See Johnsen, supra note 52, at 621 n.85. For a comprehensive discussion on
the issue of pregnancy discrimination in employment, see Williams, supra note 187.
205. See supra note 202.
206. See Hembecher, Fetal Protection Policies: Reasonable Protection or
UnreasonableLimitations on Female Employees?, 11 INDUS. REL. L. REV. 32 (1989);
Timko, Exploring the Limits of Legal Duty: A Union's Responsibility with Respect to
Fetal Protection Policies, 23 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 159 (1986); Williams, Firing the
Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection witl Employment
Opportunity Goals under Title VII, 69 GEO. L. J. 641 (1981).
207. One estimate stated that at least 100,000jobs are closed to women by virtue
of fetal vulnerability policies. See Williams, supra note 206, at 647 n.27. Considering
the fact that the source for these numbers is over ten years old, it is logical to assume
the number of hazardous jobs has, due to technology, held steady, if not increased.
208. Id. at 647-48.
209. 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
210. Id. at 1182.
211. Id. The classes were:
1. restricted jobs - those which involved contact with suspected or
known abortifacient of teratogenic agents (all fertile women
excluded);
2. controlled jobs - those in which limited contact with harmful
chemicals was possible (pregnant women could work in a controlled
job only after an individualized evaluation and signing a waiver); and
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were warned about lead exposure, but no restrictions on access to any
jobs were placed on male employees.212 In vacating in part and
remanding, the court of appeals rejected the district court's conclusion that
the policy did not discriminate against women in violation of Title VII.
Olin had argued the program did not violate title VII because the program
was not intended to discriminate against women.2"3 The court of
appeals rejected this argument, and ruled that Olin had to prove an
affirmative defense to justify the program. 214 The Wright court
promulgated a seven part standard which was developed from the business
necessity doctrine, 215 a judicially-created defense to title VII
employment discrimination claims.21 6 On remand, Olin was charged
3. unrestricted jobs - those which posed no risk to a pregnant
woman or fetus (open to all women).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1176.
Id. at 1184.
The requirements were:
1. The employer must prove that the risk to children is great enough
to require women, but not men, to be restricted.
2. The program must be based on independent, objective evidence,
and not on a good faith belief in danger.
3. There must be expert evidence to support the need for the
program.
4. There needs not be a consensus of opinion, but there must be a
considerable body of opinion that a substantial risk exists and that it
is limited to female workers.
5. There must be proof of that the risk of harm to women is greater
than to men, and the effectiveness of the program constitutes the
business necessity defense.
6. The business necessity defense can be rebutted by proof of
alternatives which would better protect employees with less disparate
impact.
7. If rebutting evidence is accepted, liability is imposed, but
whether monetary relief will be justified will depend on amount of
"overkill" caused by the program.
Id. at 1190-92.
216. The business necessity doctrine, generally stated, focuses on whether a facially
discriminatory employment policy is necessary to ensure the worker or applicant can
perform a given job safely and efficiently. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971). In Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that concern for
the health of a pregnant mother or her fetus during the first thirteen weeks of pregnancy
did not justify the use of the business necessity defense. id. at 373. The Wright court
212.
213.
214.
215.
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with the burden of proving that unborn' children of pregnant workers faced
risks from exposure to toxic hazards in the workplace, that for the safety
of fetuses fertile women, but not male workers, must be restricted, and
also that the "program of restriction is effective for the purpose."217
The claimants would then have the opportunity to rebut Olin's business
necessity defense, if possible, by proving that acceptable policies or
practices existed to better accomplish the goals of the program.2'
Therefore, the policy enacted to protect the fetus must not only be
effective, but it will be subject to challenge if there is an equally (or
more) effective policy which would have a less damaging or intrusive
effect upon the pregnant worker. 211
Two other cases involved fetal vulnerability policies concerning
pregnant hospital employee's exposure to X-rays, Zuniga v. Kleberg
County Hospital, Kingsville, Texas I and Hayes v. Shelby Memorial
Hospital.2
In both these cases, the programs were premised on
concerns for both fetal health and fear of liability for damage to the future
child.m Both programs were found to be in violation of title VII, the
respective courts holding that fear of potential liability did not constitute
business necessity' and that the hospitals had not utilized alternative
and less discriminatory methods to protect the fetuses." 4
The most recent case involving the problem of chemical exposure
in the workplace, and an employer's response to the potential hazard, was
at issue in International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls.'m In 1982
Johnson Controls shifted from a policy of giving warning of the effects of
did not follow Burwell, but instead held that under appropriate circumstances an
employer could impose otherwise impermissible restrictions that are "reasonably required
to protect the health of unborn children of women workers against hazards in the
workplace." Wright, 697 F.2d at 1189-90 (footnote omitted).
217. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1190 (citing Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791,
798 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (footnotes omitted)).
218. Id. at 1190-91.
219. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1190.
220. 692 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982).
221. 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984).
222. Zuniga, 692 F.2d at 988; Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1552-53 n.15.
223. Zuniga, 692 F.2d at 992; Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1552-53 n.15.
224. Zuniga, 692 F.2d at 993-94 (leave of absence, in accordance with established
policy); Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1553-54 (rearrange employees' duties within department to
minimize exposure to radiation). For a discussion of fetal protection policies in general
and these cases in particular, see Hembacher, supra note 206.
225. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
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lead to women who expected to: have a child to a policy of broad
exclusion.M The company excluded. women capable of bearing children
from jobs that exposed them to lead, in particular battery
manufacturing. 7 The only women exempt from the rule were those
whose inability to bear: children, was medically documented.'
The
district court granted summary judgment for the employer and the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding, among other things, that the
petitioners failed to establish .that..there was acceptable alternative policy
which would protect the.fetus.?
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the employer's policy
was facially discriminatory because the policy classified on the basis of
gender and childbearing. capacity,, rather than. fertility alone; thus the
business necessity test was inapplicable.'
The policy required only
female employees to produce proof that they were not capable of
reproducing, despite evidence ofthe harmful effect of lead exposure on
male reproductive systems. •The Court held that the employer's fetal
protection policy constitutes sex discrimination forbidden under title VII,
unless Johnson Control could "establish that sex is a "bona fide
occupational qualificatidn."'
The bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) defense is narrowly cotfisirued, said the Court, and its safety
exception is limited to' instances in which. sex or pregnancy actually
interfere with the employee's ability to perform the job. 2 2 However,
the Court held that Johnson Controls did not sufficiently establish the
defense in this case. The :BFOQ defense is not so broad that it transforms
the concern of possible'injury tO future children into an essential aspect
of battery manufacture."
One commentaior has summarized the rulings prior to Johnson
Controls on fetal vulnerability policies, and derived three criteria an
employer must establish in order, to rebut a presumption of discrimination
in a fetal vulnerability program:,
1. Through competent scientific evidence, the presence

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 1199-1200.
Id. at 1200.
Id.
International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls; 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1203.
Id. at 1204.
Id. at 1207.
Id.
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of a substantial risk of harm from dangerous substances.
2. That the hazards are limited to female employees,
which takes into account the danger to the fetus they may
be carrying.
3. That there are no less discriminatory alternatives

which would eliminate or reduce the risk.'
As the majority of the recent cases involving discrimination based
on sex or pregnancy demonstrate, current standards lend support to the
proposition that criminal sanctions for fetal abuse stemming from drug
abuse during pregnancy should not pass judicial scrutiny." Since only
women are the targets of such laws,' applying the standard enunciated
by Justice O'Connor in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,7
234. Hembacher, supra note 206, at 43. For a related view, see Fetal Rights
Controversy, supra note 66, at 273-77.
235. See supra notes 155-70 and accompanying textfor the historical development
of judicial scrutiny applied to gender-based classifications.
236. This fact alone gives rise to an inference of violating the equal protection
clause, but as MichaelM. implies, a court may look to the implications of pregnancy and
consider a fetal abuse statute constitutional. See supra notes 174-178. But an equal
protection claim may still be valid, because there is evidence that the human sperm is
also susceptible to damage from chemicals in the workplace, which can result in
congenital defects and developmental problems. See Williams, supra note 206, at 65658. Women's rights advocates take note of the fact that men are not subjected to
criminal charges, even though their drug use could damage genes or sperm. See
Sherman, supra note 3, at 28, col. 1. There is a lack of scientific studies on this issue,
but one study has been completed on the effects of paternal alcohol consumption on
offspring. While this study was conducted on rats, the researchers at Washington
University in St. Louis state that based upon their findings that learning disabilities were
noted in the rats' offspring, future studies were advisable to study this problem in
humans. N.Y. Daily News, Jan. 8, 1990, at B27, col. 3. Even if one invokes the
theory behind Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), to argue a
legislature's ability to address the problem one step at a time, it is the author's
contention that such an argument is not valid to support the imposition of criminal
sanctions. Williamson held that "[a] legislature may [in addressing the most acute part

of the problem] select [that part] and apply [the] remedy there ....
" Id. at 489
(emphasis added). Williamson allows a remedy to be applied to the most acute part of
the problem, but as this Note shows, criminal sanctions cannot legitimately be considered
a remedy for the problem of substance abuse during pregnancy. See infra notes 237-55
and accompanying text. Therefore, Williamson cannot be considered dispositive to this
issue.
237. See supra notes 169-171 and accompanying text. Under Mississippi University
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S 718 (1982), there must be a "direct, substantial
relationship between objective and means...... Id. at 725.
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the state would have to establish "exceedingly persuasive justification" to
Those cases dealing with fetal vulnerability
support the statute.""2
programs universally require that the means utilized to protect the fetus
be the least detrimental and have the least adverse impact on the pregnant
woman. Even the "reasonably designed" requirement in Webster v.
2 would require that a fetal abuse statute
Reproductive Health Services"
"reasonably designed"'
to ensure that fetuses are not further
endangered as a result of the statute. In the context of drug abuse during
pregnancy, there are a variety of other means to achieve the end of drugfree fetal development, all of which are less invasive, and more likely to
succeed."1
C. What Degree of Invasion of Privacy, If Any, Is Acceptable?
Five interrelated factors have been suggested as central to any
governmental attempt to control a pregnant woman's behavior:
1. The magnitude of harm;
2. The value of the interests involved;
3. The probability of harm to the fetus;
4. The probability of harm being avoided or removed; and
5. The proportionality of harm avoided to invasion required. 2

The first factor weighs the harm to the fetus against the harm to
the woman if her choice of activity is curtailed. 3 As discussed
earlier,'
maternal drug abuse has both immediate and long-term
detrimental effects on the developing fetus. Based upon evidence of
damage to the fetus, and the existence of a legitimate state interest in
238. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 731.
239. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
240. Id.at 521.
241. See infra notes 247-55 and accompanying text.
242. See Mathieu, supra note 28, at 50-54. These factors are cited as justifying the
imposition of criminal sanctions for alcohol and drug abuse during pregnancy. See also
Note, Maternal Substance Abuse, supra note 50, at 1233-34. But the central issue,
which both of these commentators fail to address, is that while criminal sanctions, if
imposed on one pregnant woman, will result in avoiding or removing the harm to her
fetus, countless other fetuses will be endangered when other women, with fetuses at risk,
avoid prenatal care out of fear of detection and prosecution.
243. See Mathieu, supra note 28, at 50.
244. See supra notes 59-60.
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protecting and ensuring a fetus' potentiality and quality of life, one must5
then consider the second factor: the values of the interests involved.2
Assuming a legitimate state interest, that interest must be weighed against
the mother's interests.'
The commentator who outlined these factors
acknowledged that some interests of the mother are of little or no weight,
especially those which result in the fetus being injured. u7 While a
woman's interest in walking, jogging, carrying groceries, working, or
otherwise conducting her life as she chooses involves choices which can
be considered fundamental, there is no fundamental right to use illegal
drugs.'
Obviously, if the mother's interest is in taking illegal drugs,
with no care for the effects, an attempt to control such behavior may be
supportable.'"
The third and fourth factors are also somewhat interrelated, and
will be discussed in tandem. The damage prenatal drug exposure causes
is well documented,' and the problem of drug abuse and addiction by
society at large, and among pregnant women in particular, shows no signs
of abatement. While detoxification will likely cause the mother temporary
discomfort, medical supervision can ameliorate the effects on both the
mother and the fetus.5" Because removal of the drugs pays immediate
benefits to the fetus (and the mother), the fourth factor ( the probability
of harm being avoided or removed) comes into consideration. As long as
detoxification is accomplished under supervision, the removal of harm
245. Id.
246. See infra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
247. See Mathieu, supra note 28, at 51-52.
248. See generally Baker v. Wade, 533 F. Supp 1121, (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd
other grounds, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985) ("[o]bviously, the right of privacy does not
apply to private conduct harmful to the individual participants or to society, such as the
use of drugs"); see also State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 917 (1967) (prohibition of use of illegal drugs during religious
ceremonies is not a violation of first amendment rights).
249. Baker v. Wade, 533 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
250. See supra note 60.
251. See generally Edelin, Methadone Maintenance in Pregnancy. Consequences
to Care and Outcome, 71 OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 399 (1988) (women in methadone
program had more prenatal care); Ryan, Cocaine Abuse in Pregnancy:Effects on the
Fetus and Newborn, NIDA Research Monograph No. 76, at 280 (1987) (significant
differences in birthweight, length, and head circumference between cocaine addicted
babies and drug free babies in study); see also Angelin, Pretreatment Characteristics
and Treatment Performance of Legally Coerced Versus Voluntary Methadone
MaintenanceAdmissions, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 537 (1989); Krajewski, Crack and Cocaine.
Current Medical Issues, 84 TEx. MED. 48 (1988).
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from drug consumption can be assured, in most instances, and the harm,
both from addiction and detoxification, could be avoided or

minimized.252

The final factor weighs the harm prevented against the interest
curtailed, and as discussed above, the interest in consuming illegal drugs
is entirely insupportable. 23
Considering the value of preventing the
intentional or negligent harming of a fetus, the balance tips clearly on the

side of intervention. ' When these five factors are applied to maternal
drug abuse, the conclusion is almost unavoidable that state intervention
into such situations is warranted. But this does not support any means
chosen to address the problem. As the commentator who outlined these
five factors noted, "the intervention should involve the least intrusive
means available. '"'
This admonition is the basic tenet of any
governmental action inhibiting personal choice or behavior. While there
is no right to use illegal drugs,"5 6 constitutional guidelines still dictate
the limits on how the state can act to curtail behavior, and especially in
the context of drug abuse during pregnancy, interventions less intrusive
than criminal sanctions are available, and more likely to succeed.2 57
The implications of Geduldig" and Michael M." give rise
252. See, e.g., Chasnoff, Cocaine Use in Pregnancy: PerinatalMorbidity and
Mortality, 9 NEUROTOXICOLOGY& TERATOLOGY 291 (1987) (infants exposed to cocaine
had significant depression of response to environmental stimuli compared to methadone
exposed infants); see also Ryan and Edelin, supra note 251.
253. See supra note 221-23.
254. See supra notes 217-27 and accompanying text.
255. See Mathieu, supra note 28, at 54.
256. See supra notes 221-23.
257. For example, in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647
(1974), administrative convenience was rejected as a justification for cut-off of
employment of pregnant teachers, the Court stating "administrative convenience is
insufficient to make valid what otherwise is a violation of due process of law." What this
suggests is that due process requires compelling evidence of the ability of the means
chosen to effect the goal sought, and that the easiest means is not automatically
constitutional, notwithstanding the fact that it does achieve the goal. See also infra note
252. In the context of drug abuse during pregnancy, criminal sanctions are the
equivalent of administrative convenience, and not only does this option not achieve the
goal of healthy newborns, it will likely defeat the goal. See also the observation of the
plurality in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, ("[c]onstitutional concerns are
greatest ... when the State attempts to impose its will by the force of law; the State's
power to encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far
broader." 492 U.S. 490, 510 (1989) (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 476 (1977)).
258. See supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
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to special considerations in the fetal abuse context. The former is
noteworthy for the Court's refusal to view discrimination based on
pregnancy as sex discrimination, and its classification of pregnancy as a
"risk" rather than a gender characteristic.2
But in adopting that
theory, the Court was able to uphold the statute at issue as not
discrimination based on sex, but rather a permissible differentiation
between pregnant people and non-pregnant people."
Michael M. is
significant in its acknowledgement of the fact that the sexes are not
similarly situated in certain situations, 2 and therefore statutes which
reflect those distinctions are not inherently suspect of violating equal
protection. Coupled with the fact that there is no fundamental right to use
illegal drugs, there is reason to believe that based upon the foregoing, a
statutory approach to rectify prenatal damage caused by the use of illegal
drugs may be supportable on equal protection or due process grounds, as
"rationally related" to the goal of protecting the developing fetus,
especially that fetus which will be carried to term. Nonetheless, several
factors militate strongly against the imposition of criminal sanctions.
As stated by one commentator, "There is no compelling state
interest that support regulations that will not work. Nor can [criminal
sanctions] be seen as the least restrictive alternative for dealing with the
problem."'
Even though this "compelling" standard from Roe was
altered by Webster to a "permissibly furthers" standard,'
the
imposition of criminal sanctions is not supportable. Even the "permissibly
furthers" standard requires that the challenged statute "further" the
legitimate state interest.'
The detection of women who are abusing drugs while pregnant
presents real logistical problems.
In the absence of "pregnancy
police" ' or an Orwellian big brother, 7 two highly obnoxious and
invasive concepts, this detection is likely to come about as a result of only
three occurrences: arrest for an unrelated incident, as in Brenda Vaughn's
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974).
See Johnsen, supra note 52, at 621.
See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
Field, supra note 52, at 123.
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 245-55 and accompanying text.
See Sachs, supra note 2.
267. G. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIHTY-FOUR (1949).
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situation,' when the woman delivers the child, or when she goes to the
doctor for prenatal care. The Vaughn situation was mere happenstance,
not only was she was unlucky enough to be arrested, she was unlucky to
face a judge who would incarcerate her to protect her fetus.' No one
can forcefully argue that such a method of enforcing fetal abuse statutes
is effective. Another situation where detection is possible (in fact, is most
likely) is when the mother delivers the child. At this point, however, the
damage is done, the threat of sanctions has clearly not served its purpose,
and imposition of sanctions for fetal abuse fail to rise above
vindictiveness. 210 The final situation where detection is possible is
during prenatal care. All parties can agree that this is the most important
time for intervention, because it is the most likely situation where a drug
addicted or abusing mother will be detected and can be treated to protect
her fetus. 27
But the problem is that the threat of criminal sanctions is likely
268. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
269. The judge who sentenced Brenda Vaughn was quoted as saying "[slhe's
apparently an addictive personality, and I'll be darned if I'm going to have a baby born
that way." Jost, Mother Versus Child, A.B.A. J. 84, 86 (Apr., 1989) (quoting Superior
Court Judge Peter Wolf). Some facts on this case merit mention. At the time of her
guilty plea, Judge Wolf, "as [he] does with most women drug abusers when they appear
before [him]," gave Ms. Vaughn a reprint of a newspaper article on the harm maternal
drug abuse can have on the fetus, which she claimed to have read. 117 WASH. L. REP.
441, 447 (Mar. 7, 1989). She was required to undergo drug testing in the time between
her plea and sentencing, and the presentence report indicated she had missed two test
dates. Id. at 447. At the May 24, 1988 sentencing date, upon learning that the
defendant had missed two tests, Judge Wolf ordered Ms. Vaughn be tested that day, and
the tests showed evidence of cocaine use within the last two to four days. When later
that morning she was again brought before the court, she disclosed for the first time that
she was six months pregnant. id.
270. See supra note 62.
271. See generally Field, supra note 52; see also, Diesenhouse, Punishing Pregnant
Addicts: Debate, Dismay, No Solution, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1989, at E5, col. 6
(quoting James Bopp, General Counsel, National Right to Life Committee), "[olur goal
is to protect and have babies born that are not drug dependent. Criminal sanctions are
unlikely to accomplish that goal .... We need protective action - testing and treatment
rather than punishment." But see comments of Dr. Jan Bays, director of Child Abuse
Programs at Emanuel Hospital in Portland, Oregon, "[wie must up the ante to
criminalize or impose reproductive controls on people who are out of control .... " Id.
at col. 2-3, and comments of William C. O'Malley, Prosecutor, Plymouth Co., Mass.,
"l]'d much rather see this problem dealt with by the more subtle systems of public
health, social services, and education. But ... we've had nothing but failures ....
It's
time to invoke the mechanism of last resort." Id. at col. 3-4.
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to compel many women to avoid prenatal care, solely to avoid
detection.'
This effect best illustrates the futility of criminal sanctions
as a method of ensuring fetal health. When one considers the fact that
quite often drug abuse is a function of poverty, and that poverty is a
major reason for inadequate prenatal health care,2" it becomes evident
that the threat of sanctions will merely result in fewer women seeking
prenatal care. 74 This fact aptly illustrates the theory of a state goal
which claims to be based on the legitimate goal of protecting fetal health,
but in reality acts in a manner directly opposite to its aim. The final
effect of the threat of criminal sanctions is that a woman may choose
abortion when she otherwise would not make that choice, merely to avoid
the imposition of criminal sanctions.
These considerations show how the fetal abuse statutes do not,
and cannot, "permissibly further" the state goal of protecting fetal health.
In actuality, the evidence is overwhelming that the threat of sanctions will
really have the opposite effect, and drive from prenatal care those women
who need it most."
For these reasons, while acknowledging a
legitimate state interest in protecting the fetus which will be born,
criminal sanctions for fetal abuse are ill advised and "neither necessary
nor effective in achieving their professed aim of improving the health of
the newborn population."276

V.

CONCLUSION

There is little argument that society has a legitimate and
compelling interest in ensuring that children are born healthy. Such a
goal has strong moral and ethical underpinnings, and the economic
considerations are also strongly on the side of intervention. Nevertheless,
272. See supra notes 244, and 266-74, and accompanying text.
273. "1 agree the unborn need protection, but that takes hard work to make
pregnancy a healthy condition for all women, including the poor ... through prenatal
care for everyone ..
" Diesenhouse, supra note 271, at col. 6 (quoting George L.
Annas, professor of Health Law at Boston University School of Medicine).
274. See supra notes 238-245 and accompanying text. See also comments of Molly
MeNulty, reproductive law expert and a Revlon Fellow at the National Health Law
Program in Washington, D.C., "[I1 think the long-run consequences of involving
criminal law in this problem will be to drive women away from treatment and to further
divide the family unit." Curriden, supra note 116, at 52.
275. See supra note 244.
276. Field, supra note 52, at 120.
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the evidence is compelling that criminal sanctions are the least effective
means of achieving the legitimate state'interest. Under the pretense of
ensuring fetal health and promoting a quality life, the threat of criminal
sanctions defeats, rather than promotes, that goal. As one commentator
has stated, "[criminal sanctions] will provide the very antithesis of that

which its sponsors seek; healthy babies are not the result of programs or
laws which deter prenatal care." 277
Criminal sanctions put the mother and fetus in an adversarial
relationship, which itself is not conducive to the development of a positive
mother-child relationship after birth. But as a more immediate and
damaging effect, sanctions will compel women with fetuses at risk to
avoid prenatal care. Based upon these observations, it is understandable

that the imposition of sanctions has been characterized as "a barbaric
approach to deal with someone who is [addicted], "' 278 and "a short-term,

knee-jerk solution."27w From a practical standpoint there are a multitude
of more effective, and less expensive alternatives. Educational programs
explaining the risks of drug use during pregnancy, specifically targeted to
women who need the information, is the logical first step.2" Following

up the educational program with increased state and federal funding for
prenatal care, will help every child who is to be born to receive proper
prenatal care. 21 And to stop the cycle dead in its tracks, increased
277. Note, Fetal Rights Controversy, supra note 66, at 287 n.160.
278. Diesenhouse, supra note 271, at col. 3 (quoting Eve Paul, Director of Legal
Affairs of the Planned Parenthood Federation in New York); see also supra note 62.
279. Diesenhouse, supra note 271, at col. 3 (quoting Dr. Ira J. Chasnoff, President
of NAPARE). Also, "[ilt's a punitive approach that is being taken out of frustration by
the legal and medical communities." Sachs, supra note 2, at 105 (quoting Dr.
ChasnofO. Compare these quotes from Dr. Chasnoff, especially the latter, with the
comments cited supra note 252.
280. See Note, MaternalRights,supra note 52, at 1001 ("[t]he abortion cases show
that the Constitution puts a value on personal autonomy; the state cannot abridge this
autonomy simply because it finds that approach easier than education") see also supra
note 231.
281. See Lewin, Study Cites Lack in Prenatal Care, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1989,
§ 1, at 25, col. 1. The study found that from 1984 to 1986, the years covered by the
study, the percentage of women receiving inadequate health care increased. See also
Kolata, Less PrenatalCare UrgedforMost Healthy Women, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1989,
at Al, col. 3 (discussing a report issued by the United States Public Health Service
which recommends that less prenatal care be provided to women whose fetuses are not
at risk, and given to women with fetuses at risk, noting that approximately 40% of the
nearly 4 million women who give birth each year have no apparent risk factors
[smoking, alcohol and/or drug abuse, and lack of medical care] either before or during
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funding for drug treatment programs will help women, both before and
during pregnancy, to kick habits which endanger both their own lives and

the lives of their unborn children.2"
Advocating criminal sanctions as a remedy for prenatal injury
resulting from maternal drug abuse clearly implies an awareness of the
multitude of societal and personal problems which give rise to this
unfortunate situation. But to resort to the easiest perceived remedy,
which by nature is the least effective and most damaging to the mother
and fetus, is to ignore the underlying causes for the problem and to take
the easy way out. Such an approach is not in the best interests of
pregnant women, society, or future generations.
Robert Holland

pregnancy. Id. at 22, col. 1. Simple mathematics implies that 60% of the women who
give birth each year have fetuses at risk. For these women, the panel advocates nutrition
services, treatment for drug, alcohol, and nicotine addictions, and help with personal
problems which could lead to child abuse. Id. Moreover, the panel suggests that
pregnancy education be made part of women's education, beginning in adolescence. Id.
282. "[In New York City] cocaine abuse among pregnant women has increased
3000 percent over the last ten years." French, For PregnantAddicts, a Clinic of Hope,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1989, at B1,col. 2 (quoting Elizabeth Graham, New York City
Assistant Health Commissioner). According to Ms. Graham, in 1988, about 21 out of
every 1,000 child-bearing women identified themselves as cocaine abusers. That figure
is up from 7 in 1985. Id. Dr. Wendy Chavkin surveyed 78 drug treatment programs in
New York City, and got disturbing results. 54% of the programs refused treatment to
women claiming to be pregnant and addicted, 67% denied treatment to pregnant addicts
on Medicaid, and 87% denied treatment to pregnant women on Medicaid addicted
specifically to crack. Furthermore, less than half of those programs accepting pregnant
women made arrangements for prenatal care and health care, the latter provision
demonstrated to be a condition precedent to participation of women in treatment
programs. Chavkin, supra note 64. See also Diesenhouse, supra note 60, at E26, col.
2 , ("[aicross the country there is a tremendous need for treatment that responds to
women's special needs but rehabilitation seems to have taken a second place to law
enforcement ....
")(quoting David Mulligan, the Massachusetts Commissioner of Public
Health).

